Arthur Wolk Comments on the Close Call at Philly Airport

PHILADELPHIA (CBS) — At Philadelphia International Airport on Friday morning (10/22/10), the jumbo jet was two and a half miles out on final approach. Another flight, American Airlines flight 1209 was on the ground, ready for takeoff, when air traffic controllers cleared the flight for departure.

“American 1209, the guy on final looks awfully close,” said the pilot.

And when the plane taxied onto the runway, the chartered 747 for the Phillies had to abort the landing.

“91 heavy, go around, climb and maintain 3,000, fly runway heading,” said the tower controller to the Phillies flight.

“That’s when these airplanes typically have an accident. That pilot wanted no parts of switching runways that close in, two miles in, so he declined that,” said aviation attorney Arthur Wolk. “Every airplane that time of the day at this airport was using the very same runway. That creates a problem; it’s a traffic jam.” Wolk says it appears the air traffic controller tried to do too much with too little time.

Phillies General Manager Ruben Amaro says he noticed the aborted landing onboard the plane. “Oh yeah, we had to circle, circle back around,” he told Eyewitness News when asked about the incident.

A spokesman for the FAA says general guidelines call for planes to be kept three miles apart. But when the American airliner was told to move onto the runway, the Phillies’ 747 was only two and a half miles out. When told of that, the spokesman said it’s a judgment call on the part of the air traffic controller.

“I think the tower controller was enthusiastic to get two departures out before the Phillies airplane – the 747 – landed,” Wolk said. “Unfortunately, things kind of backed up in a hurry and he wasn’t able to do that.” Wolk says that’s what causes risk. “That’s to me where the series of potential errors that could lead to an incident or an accident began,” he said.

Just how safe are the skies above Philadelphia? An exclusive CBS 3 I-Team investigation has uncovered FAA reports never before made public that provide some answers. Twenty one times this year, planes in flight and on the runway at Philadelphia International Airport have come too close, prompting FAA investigations.

Aviation expert and attorney Arthur Wolk said, “So you had the potential for a three-plane mid-air for a brief moment here, and that’s really scary.” Wolk says while alarms in the planes helped prevent a crash, he’s concerned what might have happened. “That was a bad day that could have been a really bad day, a disastrous day,” said Wolk. “But fortunately, the safeguards that were built into the systems worked.”

Don Chapman, president of the air traffic controllers union in Philadelphia, said, “The controller was given additional training to resolve the issues that might have led to that.”

Wolk Repeatedly Warned Cessna, FAA and NTSB of Icing Problems

New Airworthiness Directive on Cessna Caravan Vindicates The Wolk Law Firm's Warnings on Known Icing

In a stunning reversal the Federal Aviation Administration has issued AD 2007-10-15 on the Cessna Caravan.

Icing wind tunnel research commissioned by The Wolk Law Firm in connection with the case of Randolph vs. Cessna revealed serious flaws in the design and operation of the deicing system of that aircraft. Experts hired by Arthur Alan Wolk confirmed that the problems ranged from the choice of wing airfoil, design of the deicing boots, flaws in the design of the inflation hardware, inadequate stall warning, underpowered engine, and complete inadequacy of the pilot's operating handbook for safe flight into known icing conditions.

After a spate of icing accidents Cessna Aircraft Company, encouraged by the FAA and the NTSB revised the Pilot's Operating Handbook to prohibit the use of flaps when airspeed reductions occurred due to unshed ice accumulations.

One of the experts working for the Wolk Law Firm, Harry Riblet, a noted designer of general aviation airfoils openly criticized the Cessna, FAA, and NTSB action and wrote to them repeatedly warning that use of the flaps could help but not cure the controllability problems with the airplane when flying in icing conditions. Riblet was ridiculed by the Government and Cessna even though his airfoils adopted for use by homebuilders around the world had proven themselves stall spin proof.

This Airworthiness Directive, with the full force and effect of law, now removes any restriction for the use of flaps in icing conditions and instead requires their use when the aircraft airspeed is reduced to 110 knots or less. It also prohibits the flight of the aircraft in moderate icing conditions for which the aircraft was originally certificated and removes the words "certified for flight into known icing conditions" from the handbook without revoking the certification entirely.

The AD requires installation of a low speed warning in all Cessna Caravans and cautions pilots that the stall warning may be completely unreliable in icing conditions.

What is remarkable about the Airworthiness Directive is what it doesn't do.

1. It does not revoke the "known icing certification" of the Caravan which means it may still be dispatched into conditions where ice is reported or forecast.
2. It ignores the fact that moderate icing is unpredictable so it may still not be possible for pilots to safely exit those conditions.
3. It ignores the bad design of the deicing boots and does not require the introduction of a water separator into the system to prevent ice boot inflation line icing.
4. It does not require that all Caravan pilots be taught how to recognize and recover from a tail stall.
5. It does not require the installation of vortex generators on the boots of the wing and the horizontal stabilizer to delay the onset of ice induced stall.
6. It does not require Cessna to install a stall warning indicator that is impervious to ice induced errors.
7. It defines moderate icing encounters as a reduction in airspeed to 120 knots in cruise flight which is already in most instances a state beyond which the aircraft will be recoverable once control is lost.
8. It further defines moderate icing as an accumulation of 1/4 inch on the wing strut which is the amount of ice accumulation Cessna requires before operation of the deicing boots in the first place even in light icing conditions.

What this AD demonstrates once again is the FAA does not understand yet the aerodynamics of the Cessna Caravan but had to do something to stem the constant series of ice related accidents with these aircraft. Instead of doing what's right and what's needed, it granted Cessna yet another reprieve at the expense of safety. More will die or be maimed next winter but hopefully this is a start to the end of this battle.

NASA Deep Sixes Important Aviation Safety Information

NASA spent $8,500,000 of our money to study aviation safety the right way: interview pilots in strict confidence so they could disclose what they see as critical safety failures in our aviation transportation system. Now NASA, instead of releasing the information which shows that the FAA is totally inept at gathering safety information, has ordered the contractor to destroy it because it would be embarrassing to government and the airlines.

This stonewalling of public information obtained in the ordinary course of its duties is unforgivable and a disgrace. The data shows that the FAA is totally in the dark about aviation safety and could benefit from this NASA data because it would demonstrate how and why the FAA doesn't have a clue what's going on in the National Airspace System.

The reason no one talks to the FAA is obvious. The FAA will prosecute anyone from whom it receives information that relates to safety of flight even if the purpose of the disclosure is to improve safety. Moreover the FAA totally discounts information from the field about safety defects in aircraft so mechanics and pilots are loathe to report troubling problems as no action is ever taken. In addition, the FAA rats out the whistleblowers and gives them no protection, hanging them out to dry, to lose their jobs and to go it alone. Therefore, there is no incentive whatsoever to help the FAA.

NASA, on the other hand, gives a "get out of jail free card" with the report of sensitive safety information so there is an incentive to provide timely and helpful information that can be useful in preventing accidents. What is troubling about this revelation, however, is that a serious effort was made by NASA due to a perceived aviation safety need to get up close and personal so it could acquire the most useful data and now it will “deep six” it because it would embarrass another agency of government – the FAA – that agency being solely responsible for the safety of flight. In short, instead of using this information as a tool to improve the FAA, the most ineffective agency of government, NASA sees fit to destroy the information instead. Hide critical information that might be embarrassing to the government? Never!

Arthur Alan Wolk
October 2007

CESSNA 208 CARAVAN NEEDS CRITICAL "KNOWN ICING" IMPROVEMENTS FOR SAFETY

The Cessna 208 is a marvelous airplane for carrying lots of people and heavy cargo, but only in good weather. Flown in icing conditions the airplane is dangerous and has crashed thirty times, and nearly crashed many more. The NTSB has designated curing its dangerous history of accidents Public Enemy Number One. Nine people have been killed this icing season so far, and it's only half over.

We have represented several families whose lives have forever been changed because of the Caravan's poor performance in even light icing conditions, conditions for which Cessna Aircraft Company (the plane’s maker), and BF Goodrich (the designer and maker of the deicing boots) have said the airplane is suitable. In fact, it is not. The Caravan should not be flown in any icing conditions, and some of the operators refuse to dispatch it into any known icing weather.

The problems with the Caravan are simple. It is underpowered and, in fact, it appears to have the lowest power to weight of any turboprop single. That means it cannot climb above the ice and thus avoid it before its aerodynamics are so compromised it suffers a drastic loss of performance and control.

It has too much parasite drag, meaning there are so many unprotected surfaces that when ice collects, it seriously and quickly degrades performance to dangerously inadequate levels.

It has deicing boots that are simply inadequate to protect the wings and tail so dangerous ice accumulations even when the boots are used properly, quickly and dangerously compromise control and thus safe flight. Often there is insufficient margins to exit icing conditions safely and climbing may be impossible due to low power.

The Caravan uses engine bleed air to operate the cabin heat and the boots. It has no separate pump to operate boots like some other turboprop airplanes and has no water separator to keep moisture that collects in the boot inflation tubes from freezing and compromising the boot inflation. The bleed air extraction, together with the loss of power from deployment of the inertial separator designed to keep ice from damaging the engine compressor, drastically reduces the already underpowered airplane's ability to exit icing conditions.

The aerodynamics of the Caravan also play a role in its inability to safely handle ice. Its horizontal stabilizer does not have ice protection to the tip and the elevator balance horn is entirely unprotected. The tail provides an up force, unlike most others that provide a down force. Thus, the top surface of the horizontal stabilizer is critical. Ice on this surface causes a pitch up, loss of airspeed, wing stall, tail stall, and drives the center of lift on the wing so far aft that regaining control at any airspeed is questionable.

The failure of the FAA to understand the aerodynamics of this airplane is unforgivable given the repeated concerns expressed by the NTSB and its own knowledge of the problems reported by pilots in Caravan winter operations.

Recent Safety Recommendations by the NTSB about the Caravan bring credit on that agency's understanding that "something is wrong here" and that previous blame on pilots for accidents beyond their control is unfounded.

The Caravan is fundamentally a good design for fair weather flying. It should have had anti-icing equipment, not deicing boots that by design allow dangerous amounts of ice to collect before shedding and leave lots of ice as a residual of their operation. The Caravan should have had a cantilevered wing, instead of drag producing struts and, if cargo pod equipped it desperately needed, pod anti-ice protection. The powerplant is in need of twice the horsepower for this mission, and elevator balance horn anti-ice protection is vital.
The Caravan can be fixed and, if it had been fixed when the FAA first started to investigate icing incidents and accidents shortly after the aircraft was introduced, the airplane might have been well suited today for the all weather operations it is touted by Cessna to be capable. It is not, and the Randolph, Fry and Silvey families have suffered horribly, as have then ten little girls who have been left fatherless.

The FAA and the NTSB must do better. Twenty years have gone by since the first investigations and still no positive and effective efforts to fix the airplane. It is clear that at least the FAA lacks the technical expertise or will to understand the aerodynamics of the Caravan. At this late date, after three separate safety investigations, the FAA still thinks the bottom surface of the horizontal stabilizer is the critical lifting surface. It isn't!

It is also unfortunate for Cessna, who has had ample opportunity to fix the airplane, yet still denies it has a problem. This is litigation driven no doubt so, instead of fixing it and avoiding other accidents, other tragedies for the victims' families and other lawsuits for wrongful death, it denies the problem that everyone, including the federal authorities, knows about, and allows more accidents and more claims. Aside from the moral bankruptcy of such a position, from a purely economic standpoint, it is inexplicable.

There is hope, however. Others recognizing the problem have started addressing it themselves. Weeping wing TKS retrofits are now available to provide anti-ice protection. Larger and more capable powerplants are being STC'd by others for the aircraft and even a hot wing anti-ice system is being tested. Hopefully these non-Cessna designed and built modifications will save lives, but must be purchased at substantial cost by operators of these aircraft.

The icing accidents and incidents involving the Caravan have reached intolerable levels. Something must be done and done quickly if others are to be saved. After nearly forty years litigating airplane crashes, it never ceases to amaze me that aircraft manufacturers won't listen. Airplanes always telegraph their intention to fail long before they suffer a fatal accident. Fixing the airplane before the first accident is the least expensive means to reduce the cost of air crash litigation liability, and fixing it after the first accident will guarantee that there will never be a claim for the same defect after the payment of the first one.

Icing Season 2005/2006

WHEN IT COMES TO AVIATION SAFETY, WHO IS REALLY TO BLAME? The FAA ... The Agency That Is Supposed To Protect Us

Why does it take an air crash to raise the public's concern about aviation? Even though air travel is still the safest means of transportation (based on the percentage of fatalities compared to the number of people who fly), there are hundreds of accidents just waiting to happen ... and US Air 1016 was one of them. The FAA has known, for years, about the dangers of wind shear during hazardous weather conditions, and in fact, has been installing special Doppler radar systems at busier airports. However, the FAA never moves quickly enough. Charlotte-Douglas International Airport doesn't have their Doppler radar yet. The scheduled delivery for 1995 wasn't soon enough to have protected the 37 killed last week. While the FAA is bogged down in bureaucratic red-tape of its own making, pilots, who are the ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight, are denied timely information that can help prevent accidents like the one in Charlotte. Unfortunately, the FAA's ineptitude doesn't stop there. All too often, the FAA knows about manufacturing defects that will clearly affect the safety and/or crashworthiness of airplanes. The FAA doesn't do anything about those either, or it acts too late.

Between December of 1992 and December of 1993, 13 people were killed in two airplane crashes caused by hurricane force turbulence in the wake of Boeing 757 jetliners. The FAA knew, as early as 1989, that the 757 would, sooner or later, cost lives. Again, the FAA did nothing.

Why didn't the FAA react? By mandating safe distances between aircraft, the number of flights leaving from and arriving at airports would be cut down, which would cut into industry profits.

In the early '70s, the FAA was aware that the DC-10 baggage door had a design flaw. It did not act, and 350 people were killed in a Turkish Airlines disaster.

The FAA knew if it allowed Boeing Company to glue certain airliner sections together, they would have to monitor the long term effects. They did not, and the roof blew from an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737, while the side blew out of a Boeing 747. More fatalities resulted in both cases.

The FAA knew there were service problems with the engine attachment bolts on the Boeing 747. It did not act, and two engines came off an El Al 747, killing 45 people in the Netherlands.

The FAA has known for years about flaws in various general aviation aircraft -- everything from pilot seats that slide suddenly rearward, causing loss of aircraft control, to undrainable contamination in fuel tanks which result in engine stoppage, to tails that fluttered off hundreds of times, killing hundreds of people, to engines used in helicopters which are so unreliable that the Justice Department sued the manufacturer for fraud in regard to the engine's unreliability, while the FAA continues to certify the engine safe for flight.

The list goes on and on, but the one thing is clear. It is time to overhaul the FAA from the top down, and bottom up.

The people within the FAA who want to do their jobs and are interested in safety cannot because they are overruled by managers. People with the agency who want to change things to make the FAA more safety conscious are overruled by political considerations imposed on the FAA by influence wielded by the aircraft manufacturers -- the same manufacturers the FAA is supposed to regulate.

There is even a product liability bill that would not permit the imposition of punitive damages against an aircraft manufacturer, if the FAA certified the aircraft before it was marketed. Though everyone in government calls the FAA incompetent, Congress still wants to make the FAA's approval the difference between people being compensated and manufacturers punished, and their not being held liable at all.
The FAA has the responsibility to ensure the safety of flight and to promote aviation. Aviation does not have to be promoted anymore, but safety of flight needs a lot of work. The new FAA needs to have as its sole job the enforcement of existing regulations, the streamlining of regulations to make them more effective, and the enforcement of those regulations (for a change) against those responsible to make flight safe: the aircraft manufacturers who can make the airplanes safe.

While the FAA may not put time and money into forestalling accidents until there is a tragedy, the FAA is itself a tragedy. Somebody needs to do something about its many faults before more lives are tragically and unnecessarily lost.

FAA INFORMAITON MUST REMAIN PUBLIC

A Letter to U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets

August 24, 1999
U.S. Dept. of Transportation Dockets
Docket No. FAA-1999-6001
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Room Plaza 401
Washington, DC 20590
Re: Docket No. FAA-1999-6001; Notice No. 99-14

Gentlemen:
I oppose the introduction of a regulation that would allow the Federal Aviation Administration to afford protection of voluntary submitted information.

The predicate for this regulation is that those persons who might provide the FAA with useful safety or security information won't do so if they are fearful that the information will be disclosed in response to a FOIA request. Historically, this has been demonstrated to be an entirely false assumption. The FAA has had in place a Service Difficulty Reporting System for at least forty years to my knowledge. Mechanics and others, without any compensation or hope for it, or any fear of the disclosure of this information, have provided the necessary safety information concerning the failure or near failure of aviation components that could affect flight safety for years. Unfortunately, they are frustrated because they recognize that year after year the information they have provided is not utilized by the FAA to improve aviation safety. Many mechanics I have spoken to have said that they stopped providing service difficulty reporting information because they see model after model of aircraft with no improvements and no changes and failing for the same reasons.

Thus, the paucity of information now provided to the FAA in connection with safety has nothing to do with fear of this information being disclosed under FOIA, it has to do with the disgust by the people who are responsible for providing such information with those who are responsible for using the information effectively to prevent accidents, i.e., the FAA. Thus, the basic predicate for the regulatory change is unfounded in fact.
Indeed, the FAA in response to pressure from manufacturers has refused to divulge information provided both by the manufacturers and those in the field on the basis that it is proprietary and confidential. Thus the FAA has effectively introduced, without regulatory authority for the same, the protection that it now hopes to introduce by way of a new regulatory scheme designed for one purpose and one purpose only preventing the public from knowing and obtaining access to safety information which has been previously withheld from them by both the Government and the private sector. That is the purpose of this rule, that is the thrust behind it, that is the reason it is introduced, and it is really so blatant that the FAA must really think the public are stupid by introducing a rule that is purportedly designed to enhance safety, but in reality is nothing more than an attempt to cover up the blunders of both the FAA and the industry with respect to aviation safety.
Indeed, even thought the FAA had no authority for it, even though the FAA kept from the public all the information concerning certification blunders (like the Boeing 737 rudder system), certification and safety blunders (like the lack of fire safety on all commercial aircraft wiring and insulation systems), and the list could go on and on, now the FAA wants to turn the Government into a secret repository of information that should be disclosed to the public anyway.

Why shouldn't the public know that an aircraft is unsafe, and then make a choice not to fly it? Why shouldn't the public know that there are failure rates of aircraft of such a magnitude they shouldn't buy or fly in it? Why shouldn't the public know that there are airlines not operating safely because they are conducting paper inspections and paper repairs? In short, what the aircraft manufacturers, the airlines and others want the FAA to do, and the FAA is falling all over itself to comply with, is to make everything a secret so nobody knows how bad it is out there and how badly the FAA is doing its job.

One example strikes me as being especially telling. I wrote a FOIA request, repeated FOIA requests as a matter of fact, arising out of the crashes of United 585 and USAir 427, two Boeing 737s that crashed because of the failure of the rudder servo valve, a probable cause found after nine years of investigation by the NTSB. Of course, the FAA in the State of Washington didn't have any information that it found releasable, and when we took the deposition of Ken Frye, the FAA person in charge, FAA's lawyers shut him down when we were asking sensitive certification questions. Of course, we didn't get the information from the defendants because they cited all sorts of reasons why the information was either unavailable, or they couldn't find it, or they couldn't supply it.

Well, something surfaced that was kind of remarkable, a copy of which I am providing to you, which are minutes of the certification meeting of the Boeing 737. Well, lo and behold, it turns out that the FAA did question the certification of this aircraft, the single slab rudder, the single actuator, and even suggested that it was prone to a single point failure. Well, it's pretty obvious that if this document had gotten out officially, it would have been pretty embarrassing to the FAA, and probably to the managers who overruled the guys who figured out that the 737 shouldn't have been certified this way, so it didn't get out officially, it got out unofficially.

That's the problem, you see, with your proposed regulation. Your proposed regulation is a simple attempt to hide the truth from the public, to hide the truth from victims' families, to hide the truth from the press, to hide the truth from everyone who has to make an intelligent decision about aviation safety.
In short, this regulation is a cruel and arrogant attempt to deny access to the public from the people who are on the public's payroll to find out whether the job for which Government is being paid is, in fact, being done honestly, accurately and effectively.

I oppose this regulation, because it has been bought and paid for by industry, because it is the FAA's continuing attempt to hide its ineptitude because it is completely and absolutely unnecessary.
Even the FAA should understand that it is the threat of public disclosure of critical safety information and the legal liability that may result from it that is the most effective tool at implementing aviation safety improvements, not hiding behind some regulatory device to keep the public in the dark.

Read the Constitution.

Very truly yours,

ARTHUR ALAN WOLK

WHEN IT COMES TO AVIATION SAFETY, WHO IS REALLY TO BLAME? The FAA ... The Agency That Is Supposed To Protect Us

Why does it take an air crash to raise the public's concern about aviation? Even though air travel is still the safest means of transportation (based on the percentage of fatalities compared to the number of people who fly), there are hundreds of accidents just waiting to happen ... and US Air 1016 was one of them. The FAA has known, for years, about the dangers of wind shear during hazardous weather conditions, and in fact, has been installing special Doppler radar systems at busier airports. However, the FAA never moves quickly enough. Charlotte-Douglas International Airport doesn't have their Doppler radar yet. The scheduled delivery for 1995 wasn't soon enough to have protected the 37 killed last week. While the FAA is bogged down in bureaucratic red-tape of its own making, pilots, who are the ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight, are denied timely information that can help prevent accidents like the one in Charlotte.

Unfortunately, the FAA's ineptitude doesn't stop there. All too often, the FAA knows about manufacturing defects that will clearly affect the safety and/or crashworthiness of airplanes. The FAA doesn't do anything about those either, or it acts too late.
Between December of 1992 and December of 1993, 13 people were killed in two airplane crashes caused by hurricane force turbulence in the wake of Boeing 757 jetliners. The FAA knew, as early as 1989, that the 757 would, sooner or later, cost lives. Again, the FAA did nothing.

Why didn't the FAA react? By mandating safe distances between aircraft, the number of flights leaving from and arriving at airports would be cut down, which would cut into industry profits.
In the early '70s, the FAA was aware that the DC-10 baggage door had a design flaw. It did not act, and 350 people were killed in a Turkish Airlines disaster.

The FAA knew if it allowed Boeing Company to glue certain airliner sections together, they would have to monitor the long term effects. They did not, and the roof blew from an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737, while the side blew out of a Boeing 747. More fatalities resulted in both cases.

The FAA knew there were service problems with the engine attachment bolts on the Boeing 747. It did not act, and two engines came off an El Al 747, killing 45 people in the Netherlands.

The FAA has known for years about flaws in various general aviation aircraft -- everything from pilot seats that slide suddenly rearward, causing loss of aircraft control, to undrainable contamination in fuel tanks which result in engine stoppage, to tails that fluttered off hundreds of times, killing hundreds of people, to engines used in helicopters which are so unreliable that the Justice Department sued the manufacturer for fraud in regard to the engine's unreliability, while the FAA continues to certify the engine safe for flight.

The list goes on and on, but the one thing is clear. It is time to overhaul the FAA from the top down, and bottom up.

The people within the FAA who want to do their jobs and are interested in safety cannot because they are overruled by managers. People with the agency who want to change things to make the FAA more safety conscious are overruled by political considerations imposed on the FAA by influence wielded by the aircraft manufacturers -- the same manufacturers the FAA is supposed to regulate.

There is even a product liability bill that would not permit the imposition of punitive damages against an aircraft manufacturer, if the FAA certified the aircraft before it was marketed. Though everyone in government calls the FAA incompetent, Congress still wants to make the FAA's approval the difference between people being compensated and manufacturers punished, and their not being held liable at all.

The FAA has the responsibility to ensure the safety of flight and to promote aviation. Aviation does not have to be promoted anymore, but safety of flight needs a lot of work. The new FAA needs to have as its sole job the enforcement of existing regulations, the streamlining of regulations to make them more effective, and the enforcement of those regulations (for a change) against those responsible to make flight safe: the aircraft manufacturers who can make the airplanes safe.

While the FAA may not put time and money into forestalling accidents until there is a tragedy, the FAA is itself a tragedy. Somebody needs to do something about its many faults before more lives are tragically and unnecessarily lost.

ISN'T THE NTSB IGNORING THE OBVIOUS IN THE USAIR 427 CRASH?

An Editorial Point of View

Why hasn't the NTSB yet reported its findings on the tail of USAir 427? It was one of the largest single components of the airplane that was found and examined, but NTSB spokesperson Carl Vogt has yet to make it a subject of any news conference.

Could it be that the FAA and NTSB would be embarrassed by their previous knowledge of rudder control problems of Boeing 737s?

After a 1991 United 585 crash in Colorado Springs, under strikingly similar circumstances as the USAir 427, the NTSB recommended to the FAA that Boeing 737s be regularly inspected for the possibility of a rudder reversal problem resulting from defects in the power control unit design. The FAA established such a program requiring an inspection every 750 flight hours until the rudder power control unit is redesigned. The USAir Flight 427 aircraft had been examined four times under this inspection program.

Isn't it curious that the NTSB hasn't made this previous rudder control concern now public? Why isn't it focusing more attention on the component that might have caused a previous and similar crash rather than focusing on irrelevant items such as the thrust reverser on the engine?

Obviously, both the NTSB and the FAA would be called to task if it turned out that their recommended and approved rudder power control unit inspection program wasn't sufficient to protect the lives of 132 additional victims.

While it is still too early to draw ironclad conclusions about the cause of the USAir crash, given the obvious similarities to the Colorado Springs crash and the history of the Boeing 737 rudder control, I suggest that some immediate steps be taken to limit the rudder authority on Boeing 737s until a new rudder control can be installed. It would be better to take such a precaution in an attempt to prevent a possible rudder hard-over in light of the fact that it could have been a contributing factor to the USAir 427 crash. Isn't it time that our governmental authorities worry more about insuring public safety than they do about minimizing the economic impact of their actions on the airline industry and those who manufacture aircraft?

NTSB CONCLUDES HEARINGS ON USAir FLIGHT 427 WITHOUT CONCLUDING THE OBVIOUS-- BLIND TO JAMMING SERVO VALVE

NTSB & FAA Fail To Protect Future Passengers

PHILADELPHIA -- November 17, 1995 -- Today, the NTSB wraps up three days of investigative hearings regarding the cause of the Pittsburgh crash of USAir Flight 427 on September 8, 1994, which resulted in 132 fatalities. Yet, the NTSB and the FAA still refuse to look at the obvious cause of this crash (also the most likely cause of the 1991 United Flight 585 crash in Colorado Springs): the faulty design of the servo valve -- a key component of the Boeing 737s rudder control power unit.

According to internationally-known aviation attorney Arthur A. Wolk, "The NTSB is a `broken part' organization. If a part isn't broken, then it couldn't have caused the crash. However, a malfunctioning part can be just as fatal. The servo valve is known to jam -- for reasons that become `invisible' after the crash.
"What the NTSB fails to do," Wolk continues, "is combine the available evidence with known design limitations and come to reasonable conclusions about the cause. The NTSB and FAA know the servo valve is defectively designed, so it can cause rudder reversals and spontaneous (uncommanded) rudder movements. Hundreds of pilots have reported uncommanded rudder movements in Boeing 737s since the aircraft's original certification, but these complaints fall on deaf ears."

"The NTSB and FAA should demand modifications of the Boeing 737's servo valve simply to comply with the Federal Aviation Regulations, but -- more importantly -- they should demand modifications to save the lives of future passengers."