PHILADELPHIA -- Arthur Alan Wolk, the lawyer and aviation expert who immediately revealed the flaws in the conduct of the flight crew of Swissair 111 and the serious electrical safety defects in the MD-11 within hours of the crash, has filed his first lawsuit for a victim of the crash, a New Jersey resident, who lost her husband.
The lawsuit, which seeks damages of over $500,000,000, including compensatory and punitive damages against Swissair, Delta Air Lines, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, claims that Swissair improperly maintained the aircraft and failed to provide adequate training and information to the pilots so they would recognize the seriousness of an in-flight fire, which they could not possibly hope to fight in the air.
Wolk also faults Boeing and McDonnell Douglas for knowing that the aircraft had wiring deficiencies and flammable insulation, and failing to provide the flight crews with either a means to fight the fire or isolating various systems so that the crew would not be flying blind as a result of electrical failures as a complication of the fire. Wolk also faults Boeing and McDonnell Douglas for failing to provide adequate instructions and manuals to the flight crew so that they would recognize immediately the seriousness of the problem and their complete inability to deal with it.
Finally, Wolk faults the flight crew for apparently failing to know where they were and how close they were to the nearest airport so they could effectively get the aircraft on the ground before a fire made control impossible.
Wolk will be at the forefront of the lawsuits arising out of Swissair 111, and has been involved in most major airline crashes as an attorney for the victims.
Showing posts with label Swissair 111 Crash. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Swissair 111 Crash. Show all posts
Thursday, December 23, 1999
Wednesday, October 27, 1999
ATTORNEY WINS FIRST DOMESTIC SWISSAIR 111 SETTLEMENT
Arthur Alan Wolk Uses Portion Of Fee To Establish Group To Improve Aircarft Fire Safety
PHILADELPHIA- - Oct. 27, 1999 - Arthur Alan Wolk, internationally-known aviation attorney based in Philadelphia, on Friday, October 22, achieved a landmark first domestic settlement from Swissair flight 111. Today, Wolk announced that he is donating a portion of his fee to establish a panel of unbiased experts to study and recommend critical improvements in aircraft wiring and fire safety.
The settlement, reached on behalf of the family of 37-year-old Richard Coburn, a husband and father of three, formerly of East Brunswick, NJ, is hoped to be the first of many from the tragic plunge into the waters of Halifax, Nova Scotia of a Swissair MD-11. Wolk and Coburn's widow both hope to achieve some lasting benefit from the tragedy by working to improve aviation safety.
The cause of this accident is still under investigation by Canadian and U.S. authorities. Privately, however, most agree that Wolk's assessment, made within hours of the crash was correct - - that the disaster was preventable.
Wolk has been on the plaintiffs' steering committees of most of the country's major aircrash disasters and has correctly identified the causes of each disaster well in advance of the release of official findings. He is also credited with many times providing vital information to government investigators.
Wolk, who is a member of the Swissair 111 plaintiffs' steering committee; the group that is guiding all of the victims' cases through the courts, says that this early settlement will accelerate the process of closure for victims' families whose agony has been prolonged due to the lack of settlements thus far.
"Now the Coburn family will be secure with Richard Coburn's legacy and can begin the most important job of cherishing the memory of their wonderful husband and father. By working to improve aviation safety it is our hope that no other family will again suffer such unspeakable pain," said Wolk.
For more information, please contact Mr. Wolk at his office, 215-545-4220.
PHILADELPHIA- - Oct. 27, 1999 - Arthur Alan Wolk, internationally-known aviation attorney based in Philadelphia, on Friday, October 22, achieved a landmark first domestic settlement from Swissair flight 111. Today, Wolk announced that he is donating a portion of his fee to establish a panel of unbiased experts to study and recommend critical improvements in aircraft wiring and fire safety.
The settlement, reached on behalf of the family of 37-year-old Richard Coburn, a husband and father of three, formerly of East Brunswick, NJ, is hoped to be the first of many from the tragic plunge into the waters of Halifax, Nova Scotia of a Swissair MD-11. Wolk and Coburn's widow both hope to achieve some lasting benefit from the tragedy by working to improve aviation safety.
The cause of this accident is still under investigation by Canadian and U.S. authorities. Privately, however, most agree that Wolk's assessment, made within hours of the crash was correct - - that the disaster was preventable.
Wolk has been on the plaintiffs' steering committees of most of the country's major aircrash disasters and has correctly identified the causes of each disaster well in advance of the release of official findings. He is also credited with many times providing vital information to government investigators.
Wolk, who is a member of the Swissair 111 plaintiffs' steering committee; the group that is guiding all of the victims' cases through the courts, says that this early settlement will accelerate the process of closure for victims' families whose agony has been prolonged due to the lack of settlements thus far.
"Now the Coburn family will be secure with Richard Coburn's legacy and can begin the most important job of cherishing the memory of their wonderful husband and father. By working to improve aviation safety it is our hope that no other family will again suffer such unspeakable pain," said Wolk.
For more information, please contact Mr. Wolk at his office, 215-545-4220.
Thursday, September 23, 1999
SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 COCKPIT CREW MAY HAVE DELAYED LANDING TOO LONG
Transcripts just released between the pilots of SwissAir Flight 111, and Air Traffic Controllers, reveal a lack of urgency that consumed precious minutes, which could have avoided the crash, says Arthur Alan Wolk, pilot, aviation lawyer, and crash expert.
The transcripts show that the aircraft was at 30,000 feet, and only thirty miles from the airport, when the pilots reported smoke in the cockpit. Instead of commencing an emergency descent, and heading directly for the runway, the SwissAir pilots made several, time consuming, turns, and dumped fuel, spending nearly ten more minutes in the air than they had too.
The MD-11 could have been landed overweight without difficulty, and given the lack of any adequate means, while airborne, to fight a fire. Declaration of an emergency, at once, and a landing, at the closest airport, at any weight, was the only appropriate procedure.
We have learned, from aircraft fires, historically, that the only procedure that has a prayer of avoiding an accident, is the quickest possible descent and landing.
Wolk has calculated the shortest time possible, from report of smoke, by the flight crew, and the crash, and has concluded that landing could have taken place seven minutes after the first communication. Radar contact was lost, with the flight, 16 minutes after the crew radioed Pan an urgent, but not distress, radio call.
It's easy to second guess this crew, Wolk cautions, but perhaps this accident points up the need to revisit cockpit procedures when smoke is reported in the cockpit or cabin. The capabilities of the MD-11 to descend safely and swiftly, and land overweight, without risk, makes this crash wholly preventable.
We should not lose sight of the fact that since it was introduced, in 1991, the MD-11 has had no less than nine FAA mandated airworthiness directives concerning potential fires and smoke from wiring bundles and connectors. Not only should a directed safety investigation be ordered, at once, on MD-11 wiring, but decisions on whether to treat smoke as a life threatening emergency, aboard an aircraft, should no longer be a judgment call by the flight deck crew, Wolk suggests.
We'll never know if the pilots were concerned how they would be viewed by the chief pilot if they had declared an emergency, right away, and landed overweight, and the smoke was found to be inconsequential. Eliminating their choice in the matter may avoid such concerns, in the future, delaying safety-of-flight critical decisions.
The transcripts show that the aircraft was at 30,000 feet, and only thirty miles from the airport, when the pilots reported smoke in the cockpit. Instead of commencing an emergency descent, and heading directly for the runway, the SwissAir pilots made several, time consuming, turns, and dumped fuel, spending nearly ten more minutes in the air than they had too.
The MD-11 could have been landed overweight without difficulty, and given the lack of any adequate means, while airborne, to fight a fire. Declaration of an emergency, at once, and a landing, at the closest airport, at any weight, was the only appropriate procedure.
We have learned, from aircraft fires, historically, that the only procedure that has a prayer of avoiding an accident, is the quickest possible descent and landing.
Wolk has calculated the shortest time possible, from report of smoke, by the flight crew, and the crash, and has concluded that landing could have taken place seven minutes after the first communication. Radar contact was lost, with the flight, 16 minutes after the crew radioed Pan an urgent, but not distress, radio call.
It's easy to second guess this crew, Wolk cautions, but perhaps this accident points up the need to revisit cockpit procedures when smoke is reported in the cockpit or cabin. The capabilities of the MD-11 to descend safely and swiftly, and land overweight, without risk, makes this crash wholly preventable.
We should not lose sight of the fact that since it was introduced, in 1991, the MD-11 has had no less than nine FAA mandated airworthiness directives concerning potential fires and smoke from wiring bundles and connectors. Not only should a directed safety investigation be ordered, at once, on MD-11 wiring, but decisions on whether to treat smoke as a life threatening emergency, aboard an aircraft, should no longer be a judgment call by the flight deck crew, Wolk suggests.
We'll never know if the pilots were concerned how they would be viewed by the chief pilot if they had declared an emergency, right away, and landed overweight, and the smoke was found to be inconsequential. Eliminating their choice in the matter may avoid such concerns, in the future, delaying safety-of-flight critical decisions.
Thursday, August 5, 1999
CRUEL HOAX PERPETRATED ON THE VICTIMS OF SWISSAIR 111
Swissair and McDonnell Douglas/Boeing have perpetrated the most cruel hoax possibly imaginable on the victims of Swissair 111.
In open court before the Honorable James T. Giles, those defendants in some 170 lawsuits filed following the crash, told the court that they have agreed to share in the responsibility for the crash of Swissair 111 and not to contest liability for compensatory damages for the U.S. victims of the crash. There was, however, a proviso which was lost on most of the attendees, but not on the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee responsible to the victims of the crash to see to it that they are properly compensated. The lawyers for Swissair and Boeing conditioned their offer on the application of the Death on the High Seas Act that there be a forum non conveniens decision which would eliminate all foreign claimants against Boeing/McDonnell Douglas for product liability and a decision by the court to throw out the Article 28 cases (under the Warsaw Convention), in other words, all those foreign travelers who purchased their tickets abroad.
In short, this cruel hoax was an effort to grandstand before the public and the press in an attempt to appear that Swissair and Boeing were owning up to their unmistakable responsibility for this accident.
What is it that they really offered, however? First, the Death on the High Seas Act, which doesn't even apply to this accident, may allow for recovery of economic damages only for those who are financially dependent upon the deceased. In short, the value of the cases for children on the aircraft would be virtually nothing. The value of the loss of society, companionship, loss of guidance and tutelage, fear of impending death, pain and suffering, and all of those intangible, non-economic items which are truly the measure of the loss of a person, might not be recoverable under the Death on the High Seas Act.
The Death on the High Seas Act, in fact, is so tenuous that both Houses of Congress have voted to either eliminate it retroactively to the crash of TWA 800, which preceded Swissair 111, or vastly limit its impact. Indeed, the crash of Swissair 111 didn't happen on the High Seas, but in Canadian territorial waters.
Nonetheless, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and Swissair would want to eliminate most of the damages recoverable by requiring as a condition of their payment the application of the hideous limitations that are imposed by a statute which most everyone agrees has long since outlived its usefulness.
In addition, in this world economy, the defendants would have the court throw out all claims for those on the aircraft who were not U.S. citizens, regardless of the basis of their claim.
The MD-11 was designed, certified and manufactured in California. It is supported both with respect to parts, service instructions, service bulletins and airworthiness directives from the United States. The pilot flight manuals were created in the United States, and supplements prepared, even to this day, in the United States. All the wiring, flammable insulation and virtually all of the installations that may be relevant to this accident and its cause occurred in the United States or by designers or manufacturers in the United States. Notwithstanding these facts, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing claim that it is not convenient for the litigation against them to take place in the United States. Where are the designers? Where are the certification people? Where are the people who built the aircraft? They are right here in the United States. Where are the people who designed and built the entertainment system? They are in the United States. The home office of McDonnell Douglas was in St. Louis, Missouri.
To have it the way the defendants want it, an American sitting in seat 4-A would have an entirely different recovery and different law applied to his recovery than a person sitting in seat 4-B. If the person sitting in 4-B happened to be a child even from the U.S., there would virtually no recovery. If the person in 4-A was a man who had no one dependent upon him, there would be virtually no recovery. If the person in 4-C was a Swiss citizen, there would be virtually no recovery except that provided under Swiss law.
Instead of resolving all of the cases in one single place before a Judge uniquely qualified to handle the case, in a court designed to handle such disasters, with procedures established to facilitate the administration of justice, the defendants would have two-thirds of the cases sent to twelve different countries, the application of twelve different sets of laws, with only God knows how much delay.
The only thing worse than the crash of Swissair 111 into Peggy's Cove last September was the charade on the public, the world press and, worse, the court that Swissair, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing pulled on August 5, 1999.
For more information about Swissair Flight 111, call Arthur Alan Wolk, Esq. at (215) 545-4220.
In open court before the Honorable James T. Giles, those defendants in some 170 lawsuits filed following the crash, told the court that they have agreed to share in the responsibility for the crash of Swissair 111 and not to contest liability for compensatory damages for the U.S. victims of the crash. There was, however, a proviso which was lost on most of the attendees, but not on the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee responsible to the victims of the crash to see to it that they are properly compensated. The lawyers for Swissair and Boeing conditioned their offer on the application of the Death on the High Seas Act that there be a forum non conveniens decision which would eliminate all foreign claimants against Boeing/McDonnell Douglas for product liability and a decision by the court to throw out the Article 28 cases (under the Warsaw Convention), in other words, all those foreign travelers who purchased their tickets abroad.
In short, this cruel hoax was an effort to grandstand before the public and the press in an attempt to appear that Swissair and Boeing were owning up to their unmistakable responsibility for this accident.
What is it that they really offered, however? First, the Death on the High Seas Act, which doesn't even apply to this accident, may allow for recovery of economic damages only for those who are financially dependent upon the deceased. In short, the value of the cases for children on the aircraft would be virtually nothing. The value of the loss of society, companionship, loss of guidance and tutelage, fear of impending death, pain and suffering, and all of those intangible, non-economic items which are truly the measure of the loss of a person, might not be recoverable under the Death on the High Seas Act.
The Death on the High Seas Act, in fact, is so tenuous that both Houses of Congress have voted to either eliminate it retroactively to the crash of TWA 800, which preceded Swissair 111, or vastly limit its impact. Indeed, the crash of Swissair 111 didn't happen on the High Seas, but in Canadian territorial waters.
Nonetheless, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and Swissair would want to eliminate most of the damages recoverable by requiring as a condition of their payment the application of the hideous limitations that are imposed by a statute which most everyone agrees has long since outlived its usefulness.
In addition, in this world economy, the defendants would have the court throw out all claims for those on the aircraft who were not U.S. citizens, regardless of the basis of their claim.
The MD-11 was designed, certified and manufactured in California. It is supported both with respect to parts, service instructions, service bulletins and airworthiness directives from the United States. The pilot flight manuals were created in the United States, and supplements prepared, even to this day, in the United States. All the wiring, flammable insulation and virtually all of the installations that may be relevant to this accident and its cause occurred in the United States or by designers or manufacturers in the United States. Notwithstanding these facts, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing claim that it is not convenient for the litigation against them to take place in the United States. Where are the designers? Where are the certification people? Where are the people who built the aircraft? They are right here in the United States. Where are the people who designed and built the entertainment system? They are in the United States. The home office of McDonnell Douglas was in St. Louis, Missouri.
To have it the way the defendants want it, an American sitting in seat 4-A would have an entirely different recovery and different law applied to his recovery than a person sitting in seat 4-B. If the person sitting in 4-B happened to be a child even from the U.S., there would virtually no recovery. If the person in 4-A was a man who had no one dependent upon him, there would be virtually no recovery. If the person in 4-C was a Swiss citizen, there would be virtually no recovery except that provided under Swiss law.
Instead of resolving all of the cases in one single place before a Judge uniquely qualified to handle the case, in a court designed to handle such disasters, with procedures established to facilitate the administration of justice, the defendants would have two-thirds of the cases sent to twelve different countries, the application of twelve different sets of laws, with only God knows how much delay.
The only thing worse than the crash of Swissair 111 into Peggy's Cove last September was the charade on the public, the world press and, worse, the court that Swissair, McDonnell Douglas and Boeing pulled on August 5, 1999.
For more information about Swissair Flight 111, call Arthur Alan Wolk, Esq. at (215) 545-4220.
Friday, April 23, 1999
DEFECTIVE WIRING IS HIGH ON THE LIST OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE SMOKE THAT BEFELL SWISSAIR 111
Aviation attorney, Arthur Alan Wolk, who has done substantial research in the field of aircraft fires, notes that the United States Navy refused to allow the continued use of Kapton in Navy fighters because of its poor performance, specifically its propensity for arcing and the propagation of dangerous fire-producing sparks. The FAA was made aware long before this crash that Kapton was a hazardous wiring for use in aircraft, yet did not mandate more stringent inspections of aircraft in which Kapton was used as electrical insulation.
Kapton was described by DuPont, its manufacturer, as having "outstanding thermal, mechanical, chemical and electrical properties." In fact, Boeing engineers concluded that Kapton was completely unsuitable because when wires arced within the Kapton insulation, Kapton became a carbon track, allowing further propagation of the electrical arcing, much like a dynamite fuse.
This clearly made Kapton a bomb waiting to go off in any aircraft in which it was utilized.
It is indefensible that both the FAA and the manufacturer of this aircraft would permit the use of electrical wiring in a civilian, passenger carrying airliner, knowing that in an aircraft in which the crew is equipped with an ejection seat, the material was found to be unsuitable because of its fire and arcing propagation characteristics, says Wolk.
This will be undoubtedly a very ugly and embarrassing investigation for the industry and a further embarrassment to the FAA, which already has thousands of lives etched on its tombstone of ineptitude, says Wolk.
Kapton was described by DuPont, its manufacturer, as having "outstanding thermal, mechanical, chemical and electrical properties." In fact, Boeing engineers concluded that Kapton was completely unsuitable because when wires arced within the Kapton insulation, Kapton became a carbon track, allowing further propagation of the electrical arcing, much like a dynamite fuse.
This clearly made Kapton a bomb waiting to go off in any aircraft in which it was utilized.
It is indefensible that both the FAA and the manufacturer of this aircraft would permit the use of electrical wiring in a civilian, passenger carrying airliner, knowing that in an aircraft in which the crew is equipped with an ejection seat, the material was found to be unsuitable because of its fire and arcing propagation characteristics, says Wolk.
This will be undoubtedly a very ugly and embarrassing investigation for the industry and a further embarrassment to the FAA, which already has thousands of lives etched on its tombstone of ineptitude, says Wolk.
Friday, January 22, 1999
NEW EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT AVIATION LAWYER, ARTHUR ALAN WOLK, CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED CAUSE OF SWISSAIR 111 WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE CRASH
-- Jan. 22, 1999 -- According to Philadelphia aviation attorney, Arthur Alan Wolk, analysis of the cockpit voice recorder of Swissair 111 reveals a disagreement between the captain and first officer on the appropriate procedures to be followed when smoke began filling the cockpit.
The first officer recommended that the aircraft be landed immediately, and the captain declined that recommendation. That decision was fatal to the crew and all the passengers aboard.
Fire in an aircraft cabin is one of the most serious emergencies that can affect an aircraft in-flight. An emergency descent and landing is the only procedure that can save the aircraft. There was nothing to prevent Swissair 111 from making a safe landing within minutes of the first discovery of smoke, and nothing would have presented any danger to the passengers or crew by landing slightly overweight on a runway that was more than ample.
It is sad that so many lost their lives, but hopefully this will remove any doubt from any airline and from any flight crew that smoke in an aircraft is not a time for a majority vote; it's the time for the fastest possible emergency landing at the nearest airport, regardless of the circumstances.
Although immediately following the crash Swissair denied that such a landing was possible, analysis of procedures in the MD-11 flight manual reveal that such a landing at Halifax could have been safely made within seven minutes of the discovery of smoke -- about half the time the aircraft remained airborne after that discovery.
Other parts of the investigation may reveal that electronic engine controls need to be isolated from electrical faults so that loss of engine power does not complicate the emergency landing process. There is much more to be learned from the investigation of this crash, but one thing is certain -- there is neither adequate means nor training currently available to fight a fire in an aircraft in-flight, in spite of the well-worn but true statement "where there's smoke there's fire".
The first officer recommended that the aircraft be landed immediately, and the captain declined that recommendation. That decision was fatal to the crew and all the passengers aboard.
Fire in an aircraft cabin is one of the most serious emergencies that can affect an aircraft in-flight. An emergency descent and landing is the only procedure that can save the aircraft. There was nothing to prevent Swissair 111 from making a safe landing within minutes of the first discovery of smoke, and nothing would have presented any danger to the passengers or crew by landing slightly overweight on a runway that was more than ample.
It is sad that so many lost their lives, but hopefully this will remove any doubt from any airline and from any flight crew that smoke in an aircraft is not a time for a majority vote; it's the time for the fastest possible emergency landing at the nearest airport, regardless of the circumstances.
Although immediately following the crash Swissair denied that such a landing was possible, analysis of procedures in the MD-11 flight manual reveal that such a landing at Halifax could have been safely made within seven minutes of the discovery of smoke -- about half the time the aircraft remained airborne after that discovery.
Other parts of the investigation may reveal that electronic engine controls need to be isolated from electrical faults so that loss of engine power does not complicate the emergency landing process. There is much more to be learned from the investigation of this crash, but one thing is certain -- there is neither adequate means nor training currently available to fight a fire in an aircraft in-flight, in spite of the well-worn but true statement "where there's smoke there's fire".
Friday, October 23, 1998
SWISSAIR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES NEED TO BE CHANGED IF THEIR SIMULATOR STUDIES ARE ACCURATE AVIATION ATTORNEY AND PILOT EXPERT SAYS
Aviation attorney and pilot expert, Arthur Alan Wolk, says that if Swissair's simulator studies, which claim that the crew could not have descended from 33,000' to land at Halifax in 70 miles, nor landed overweight on the more than 8,000' of runway available are correct, Swissair needs to change its emergency procedures because that's why this airplane crashed.
The MD-11, which operated as Swissair Flight 111, was nowhere near maximum takeoff weight at the time it left John F. Kennedy Airport with its relatively short 6-1/2 hour flight. The MD-11 has a range of over 8,000 miles and was making a flight of about half of that to Geneva. Therefore, its weight at the time of takeoff was more on the order of 500,000 pounds than the over 700,000 pounds for a maximum range flight.
At the time the crew first reported an urgent situation, approximately 70 miles from Halifax and at 33,000', this airplane was only about 50,000 pounds above maximum landing weight, essentially a non-event for that model airplane. The runway requirement for maximum landing weight for an MD-11 is only 6,500', leaving ample room for any excess distance required for the slight additional weight that Swissair 111 was at the time of the first urgent call to air traffic control. Swissair says in its simulator studies, the airplane could not have been stopped in 8,000'. That is impossible if the simulator was being operated properly, says Wolk.
Swissair also claims that the airplane could not have descended from 33,000' in time to land at the airport. Wolk says that this statement is absolutely false. The emergency procedure that exists for the MD-11 would bring the airplane down from 33,000' to sea level in less than 5 minutes, a descent rate that would be adequate even to land the airplane at Halifax if it started such a descent a 30 miles out, says Wolk.
If Swissair's emergency procedures are such that the crew thought they could not have descended from altitude, nor landed on the runway at the weight Swissair 111 was at the time it reported smoke in the cockpit, then Swissair's emergency procedures and training need to be changed at once.
Every U.S. MD-11 flight crew Wolk has spoken to has confirmed his opinion and calculations that there would have been no impediment whatsoever for the aircraft to have landed at Halifax in less than 10 minutes from the time the crew first reported smoke. Therefore, Swissair's flight crew could very well have been a victim of Swissair's own inadequate emergency procedures training, if Swissair is to be believed.
Investigators need to examine the emergency procedures established by Swissair in its procedures manual to see if adequate provision has been made for dealing with the very real emergency of smoke in the cockpit.
The MD-11, which operated as Swissair Flight 111, was nowhere near maximum takeoff weight at the time it left John F. Kennedy Airport with its relatively short 6-1/2 hour flight. The MD-11 has a range of over 8,000 miles and was making a flight of about half of that to Geneva. Therefore, its weight at the time of takeoff was more on the order of 500,000 pounds than the over 700,000 pounds for a maximum range flight.
At the time the crew first reported an urgent situation, approximately 70 miles from Halifax and at 33,000', this airplane was only about 50,000 pounds above maximum landing weight, essentially a non-event for that model airplane. The runway requirement for maximum landing weight for an MD-11 is only 6,500', leaving ample room for any excess distance required for the slight additional weight that Swissair 111 was at the time of the first urgent call to air traffic control. Swissair says in its simulator studies, the airplane could not have been stopped in 8,000'. That is impossible if the simulator was being operated properly, says Wolk.
Swissair also claims that the airplane could not have descended from 33,000' in time to land at the airport. Wolk says that this statement is absolutely false. The emergency procedure that exists for the MD-11 would bring the airplane down from 33,000' to sea level in less than 5 minutes, a descent rate that would be adequate even to land the airplane at Halifax if it started such a descent a 30 miles out, says Wolk.
If Swissair's emergency procedures are such that the crew thought they could not have descended from altitude, nor landed on the runway at the weight Swissair 111 was at the time it reported smoke in the cockpit, then Swissair's emergency procedures and training need to be changed at once.
Every U.S. MD-11 flight crew Wolk has spoken to has confirmed his opinion and calculations that there would have been no impediment whatsoever for the aircraft to have landed at Halifax in less than 10 minutes from the time the crew first reported smoke. Therefore, Swissair's flight crew could very well have been a victim of Swissair's own inadequate emergency procedures training, if Swissair is to be believed.
Investigators need to examine the emergency procedures established by Swissair in its procedures manual to see if adequate provision has been made for dealing with the very real emergency of smoke in the cockpit.
Friday, September 4, 1998
FAA OVERSIGHT MAY BE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN SWISSAIR 111 CRASH
MD-11 Plane Got 4 FAA-Mandated "Airworthiness Directives" In 5 Years
PHILADELPHIA -- September 4, 1998 - Preliminary information surrounding the crash of Swissair Flight 111 in Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on Wednesday, September 2, 1998, raises serious concerns, says aviation attorney and crash investigator, Arthur Alan Wolk, Esq. Specifically, Wolk is worried about the quality of FAA oversight with regard to the plane involved -- an MD-11. "Since 1993," says the nationally-known aviation attorney, "the MD-11 has had four FAA-mandated airworthiness directives (demands for a critical examination). Inspections of the wire bundles were ordered to avoid sparks, fire and, in fact, smoke in the cockpit.
"If there are four separate areas of the airplane needing examination to avoid electrical fires, the FAA should realize that many other areas would also require inspection. I believe the MD-11 may have given warnings prior to the outbreak of fire. It is likely that the way its wiring bundles were assembled had created chaffing which resulted in sparks leading to fire," adds Wolk.
According to Wolk, who examined the four airworthiness directives, the same FAA engineer was responsible for each one. "Why didn't it occur to him," asks Wolk, "that if the airplane has four problematic areas of wiring, that it may well have four hundred areas requiring a careful examination?"
Wolk also says investigators needs to evaluate the emergency procedures that are being recommended to flight crews in the event of smoke and fire in an airplane. "Flight crews should be clearly told that smoke should always be taken seriously. Any smoke, however slight it might appear, should be considered as a potentially serious fire and warrant an emergency decent to landing regardless of the aircraft's weight. It appears that it took 16 minutes from the time the Swissair crew said 'PAN" (which is considered an urgent call - not an emergency or distress call) until the aircraft was lost on radar at approximately 8000'. This indicates that the aircraft was descending at less than 2000'/minute, which is a normal and leisurely descent, rather than an emergency one. Unfortunately, while it is hindsight, an emergency descent at more than 6000'/minute might have saved precious time and could have gotten the airplane to the airport."
Wolk summarizes, "In my view the crash scene isn't the only thing that warrants an in-depth investigation. The quality of the FAA's oversight should be investigated and, if found faulty, fixed - before yet another air tragedy that could easily have been avoided occurs."
PHILADELPHIA -- September 4, 1998 - Preliminary information surrounding the crash of Swissair Flight 111 in Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on Wednesday, September 2, 1998, raises serious concerns, says aviation attorney and crash investigator, Arthur Alan Wolk, Esq. Specifically, Wolk is worried about the quality of FAA oversight with regard to the plane involved -- an MD-11. "Since 1993," says the nationally-known aviation attorney, "the MD-11 has had four FAA-mandated airworthiness directives (demands for a critical examination). Inspections of the wire bundles were ordered to avoid sparks, fire and, in fact, smoke in the cockpit.
"If there are four separate areas of the airplane needing examination to avoid electrical fires, the FAA should realize that many other areas would also require inspection. I believe the MD-11 may have given warnings prior to the outbreak of fire. It is likely that the way its wiring bundles were assembled had created chaffing which resulted in sparks leading to fire," adds Wolk.
According to Wolk, who examined the four airworthiness directives, the same FAA engineer was responsible for each one. "Why didn't it occur to him," asks Wolk, "that if the airplane has four problematic areas of wiring, that it may well have four hundred areas requiring a careful examination?"
Wolk also says investigators needs to evaluate the emergency procedures that are being recommended to flight crews in the event of smoke and fire in an airplane. "Flight crews should be clearly told that smoke should always be taken seriously. Any smoke, however slight it might appear, should be considered as a potentially serious fire and warrant an emergency decent to landing regardless of the aircraft's weight. It appears that it took 16 minutes from the time the Swissair crew said 'PAN" (which is considered an urgent call - not an emergency or distress call) until the aircraft was lost on radar at approximately 8000'. This indicates that the aircraft was descending at less than 2000'/minute, which is a normal and leisurely descent, rather than an emergency one. Unfortunately, while it is hindsight, an emergency descent at more than 6000'/minute might have saved precious time and could have gotten the airplane to the airport."
Wolk summarizes, "In my view the crash scene isn't the only thing that warrants an in-depth investigation. The quality of the FAA's oversight should be investigated and, if found faulty, fixed - before yet another air tragedy that could easily have been avoided occurs."
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