On January 18, 2000, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, decried the publishing on Dateline ABC of portions of the audiotape from the cockpit voice recorder of the Cali, Colombia American Airlines crash in 1995. On that audiotape were communications among the flight crew that clearly show that they had violated the requirements of any sensible operation of the aircraft, and demonstrated further that they had no situational awareness certainly necessary for flying in mountainous terrain.
The Chairman said that Congress put restrictions on the use of CVRs for the "advancement of air safety." Nothing could be further from the truth, and the Chairman should investigate further before making such statements, which mislead the public.
The reason Congress restricted the release of the cockpit voice recorder tapes was because it was lobbied by the pilots' union after the release of cockpit voice recorder tapes from other accidents showed that supposedly professional flight crews were violating all of the rules of common sense in the operation of aircraft at critical times during the flight and immediately preceding accidents. Cockpit voice recorder tapes that were publicized revealed that pilots were talking about women, cars, sex acts, and the like at critical moments of the flight and not paying attention to their flying duties, which resulted in tragic accidents and loss of life. This was extremely embarrassing to the airline industry, to pilots who were members of the pilots' union, and to the Federal government because no one was enforcing the sterile cockpit rule which precludes any non-pertinent conversation when the aircraft is at 10,000 or below.
The enactment of the cockpit voice recorder restriction statute had nothing to do with safety, the enhancement of safety, or anything related to safety. It had to do with embarrassment, and depriving the public of the right to know what was going on in the cockpits of airliners which they thought was strictly business.
Rather than enhancing safety, or being designed to enhance safety, the Bill to which the Chairman of the NTSB refers has worked exactly the other way. Exposing non-pertinent conversation and the ineptitude of pilots causes public awareness, public discussion (among pilots, too), and will result long-term in the enhancement of safety, rather than keeping it secret and having nobody know what really happened in the cockpit.
The law should be changed and the NTSB should be better informed as to what lobbyist it was who got the law passed in the first place.
Showing posts with label NTSB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NTSB. Show all posts
Thursday, February 22, 2007
Thursday, December 22, 2005
CESSNA 208 CARAVAN NEEDS CRITICAL "KNOWN ICING" IMPROVEMENTS FOR SAFETY
The Cessna 208 is a marvelous airplane for carrying lots of people and heavy cargo, but only in good weather. Flown in icing conditions the airplane is dangerous and has crashed thirty times, and nearly crashed many more. The NTSB has designated curing its dangerous history of accidents Public Enemy Number One. Nine people have been killed this icing season so far, and it's only half over.
We have represented several families whose lives have forever been changed because of the Caravan's poor performance in even light icing conditions, conditions for which Cessna Aircraft Company (the plane’s maker), and BF Goodrich (the designer and maker of the deicing boots) have said the airplane is suitable. In fact, it is not. The Caravan should not be flown in any icing conditions, and some of the operators refuse to dispatch it into any known icing weather.
The problems with the Caravan are simple. It is underpowered and, in fact, it appears to have the lowest power to weight of any turboprop single. That means it cannot climb above the ice and thus avoid it before its aerodynamics are so compromised it suffers a drastic loss of performance and control.
It has too much parasite drag, meaning there are so many unprotected surfaces that when ice collects, it seriously and quickly degrades performance to dangerously inadequate levels.
It has deicing boots that are simply inadequate to protect the wings and tail so dangerous ice accumulations even when the boots are used properly, quickly and dangerously compromise control and thus safe flight. Often there is insufficient margins to exit icing conditions safely and climbing may be impossible due to low power.
The Caravan uses engine bleed air to operate the cabin heat and the boots. It has no separate pump to operate boots like some other turboprop airplanes and has no water separator to keep moisture that collects in the boot inflation tubes from freezing and compromising the boot inflation. The bleed air extraction, together with the loss of power from deployment of the inertial separator designed to keep ice from damaging the engine compressor, drastically reduces the already underpowered airplane's ability to exit icing conditions.
The aerodynamics of the Caravan also play a role in its inability to safely handle ice. Its horizontal stabilizer does not have ice protection to the tip and the elevator balance horn is entirely unprotected. The tail provides an up force, unlike most others that provide a down force. Thus, the top surface of the horizontal stabilizer is critical. Ice on this surface causes a pitch up, loss of airspeed, wing stall, tail stall, and drives the center of lift on the wing so far aft that regaining control at any airspeed is questionable.
The failure of the FAA to understand the aerodynamics of this airplane is unforgivable given the repeated concerns expressed by the NTSB and its own knowledge of the problems reported by pilots in Caravan winter operations.
Recent Safety Recommendations by the NTSB about the Caravan bring credit on that agency's understanding that "something is wrong here" and that previous blame on pilots for accidents beyond their control is unfounded.
The Caravan is fundamentally a good design for fair weather flying. It should have had anti-icing equipment, not deicing boots that by design allow dangerous amounts of ice to collect before shedding and leave lots of ice as a residual of their operation. The Caravan should have had a cantilevered wing, instead of drag producing struts and, if cargo pod equipped it desperately needed, pod anti-ice protection. The powerplant is in need of twice the horsepower for this mission, and elevator balance horn anti-ice protection is vital.
The Caravan can be fixed and, if it had been fixed when the FAA first started to investigate icing incidents and accidents shortly after the aircraft was introduced, the airplane might have been well suited today for the all weather operations it is touted by Cessna to be capable. It is not, and the Randolph, Fry and Silvey families have suffered horribly, as have then ten little girls who have been left fatherless.
The FAA and the NTSB must do better. Twenty years have gone by since the first investigations and still no positive and effective efforts to fix the airplane. It is clear that at least the FAA lacks the technical expertise or will to understand the aerodynamics of the Caravan. At this late date, after three separate safety investigations, the FAA still thinks the bottom surface of the horizontal stabilizer is the critical lifting surface. It isn't!
It is also unfortunate for Cessna, who has had ample opportunity to fix the airplane, yet still denies it has a problem. This is litigation driven no doubt so, instead of fixing it and avoiding other accidents, other tragedies for the victims' families and other lawsuits for wrongful death, it denies the problem that everyone, including the federal authorities, knows about, and allows more accidents and more claims. Aside from the moral bankruptcy of such a position, from a purely economic standpoint, it is inexplicable.
There is hope, however. Others recognizing the problem have started addressing it themselves. Weeping wing TKS retrofits are now available to provide anti-ice protection. Larger and more capable powerplants are being STC'd by others for the aircraft and even a hot wing anti-ice system is being tested. Hopefully these non-Cessna designed and built modifications will save lives, but must be purchased at substantial cost by operators of these aircraft.
The icing accidents and incidents involving the Caravan have reached intolerable levels. Something must be done and done quickly if others are to be saved. After nearly forty years litigating airplane crashes, it never ceases to amaze me that aircraft manufacturers won't listen. Airplanes always telegraph their intention to fail long before they suffer a fatal accident. Fixing the airplane before the first accident is the least expensive means to reduce the cost of air crash litigation liability, and fixing it after the first accident will guarantee that there will never be a claim for the same defect after the payment of the first one.
Icing Season 2005/2006
We have represented several families whose lives have forever been changed because of the Caravan's poor performance in even light icing conditions, conditions for which Cessna Aircraft Company (the plane’s maker), and BF Goodrich (the designer and maker of the deicing boots) have said the airplane is suitable. In fact, it is not. The Caravan should not be flown in any icing conditions, and some of the operators refuse to dispatch it into any known icing weather.
The problems with the Caravan are simple. It is underpowered and, in fact, it appears to have the lowest power to weight of any turboprop single. That means it cannot climb above the ice and thus avoid it before its aerodynamics are so compromised it suffers a drastic loss of performance and control.
It has too much parasite drag, meaning there are so many unprotected surfaces that when ice collects, it seriously and quickly degrades performance to dangerously inadequate levels.
It has deicing boots that are simply inadequate to protect the wings and tail so dangerous ice accumulations even when the boots are used properly, quickly and dangerously compromise control and thus safe flight. Often there is insufficient margins to exit icing conditions safely and climbing may be impossible due to low power.
The Caravan uses engine bleed air to operate the cabin heat and the boots. It has no separate pump to operate boots like some other turboprop airplanes and has no water separator to keep moisture that collects in the boot inflation tubes from freezing and compromising the boot inflation. The bleed air extraction, together with the loss of power from deployment of the inertial separator designed to keep ice from damaging the engine compressor, drastically reduces the already underpowered airplane's ability to exit icing conditions.
The aerodynamics of the Caravan also play a role in its inability to safely handle ice. Its horizontal stabilizer does not have ice protection to the tip and the elevator balance horn is entirely unprotected. The tail provides an up force, unlike most others that provide a down force. Thus, the top surface of the horizontal stabilizer is critical. Ice on this surface causes a pitch up, loss of airspeed, wing stall, tail stall, and drives the center of lift on the wing so far aft that regaining control at any airspeed is questionable.
The failure of the FAA to understand the aerodynamics of this airplane is unforgivable given the repeated concerns expressed by the NTSB and its own knowledge of the problems reported by pilots in Caravan winter operations.
Recent Safety Recommendations by the NTSB about the Caravan bring credit on that agency's understanding that "something is wrong here" and that previous blame on pilots for accidents beyond their control is unfounded.
The Caravan is fundamentally a good design for fair weather flying. It should have had anti-icing equipment, not deicing boots that by design allow dangerous amounts of ice to collect before shedding and leave lots of ice as a residual of their operation. The Caravan should have had a cantilevered wing, instead of drag producing struts and, if cargo pod equipped it desperately needed, pod anti-ice protection. The powerplant is in need of twice the horsepower for this mission, and elevator balance horn anti-ice protection is vital.
The Caravan can be fixed and, if it had been fixed when the FAA first started to investigate icing incidents and accidents shortly after the aircraft was introduced, the airplane might have been well suited today for the all weather operations it is touted by Cessna to be capable. It is not, and the Randolph, Fry and Silvey families have suffered horribly, as have then ten little girls who have been left fatherless.
The FAA and the NTSB must do better. Twenty years have gone by since the first investigations and still no positive and effective efforts to fix the airplane. It is clear that at least the FAA lacks the technical expertise or will to understand the aerodynamics of the Caravan. At this late date, after three separate safety investigations, the FAA still thinks the bottom surface of the horizontal stabilizer is the critical lifting surface. It isn't!
It is also unfortunate for Cessna, who has had ample opportunity to fix the airplane, yet still denies it has a problem. This is litigation driven no doubt so, instead of fixing it and avoiding other accidents, other tragedies for the victims' families and other lawsuits for wrongful death, it denies the problem that everyone, including the federal authorities, knows about, and allows more accidents and more claims. Aside from the moral bankruptcy of such a position, from a purely economic standpoint, it is inexplicable.
There is hope, however. Others recognizing the problem have started addressing it themselves. Weeping wing TKS retrofits are now available to provide anti-ice protection. Larger and more capable powerplants are being STC'd by others for the aircraft and even a hot wing anti-ice system is being tested. Hopefully these non-Cessna designed and built modifications will save lives, but must be purchased at substantial cost by operators of these aircraft.
The icing accidents and incidents involving the Caravan have reached intolerable levels. Something must be done and done quickly if others are to be saved. After nearly forty years litigating airplane crashes, it never ceases to amaze me that aircraft manufacturers won't listen. Airplanes always telegraph their intention to fail long before they suffer a fatal accident. Fixing the airplane before the first accident is the least expensive means to reduce the cost of air crash litigation liability, and fixing it after the first accident will guarantee that there will never be a claim for the same defect after the payment of the first one.
Icing Season 2005/2006
Wednesday, June 8, 2005
American 1420: A Federal Jury v. the NTSB
"NTSB" is a familiar abbreviation for the National Transportation Safety Board, the governmental entity tasked with investigation of all major aviation accidents in this Country. But, given the manner in which it investigates accidents (inviting participation from manufacturers and other litigation interested parties), it frequently fails to get all the facts and interpret them accurately.
The investigation by the NTSB after the June 1, 1999 crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 at Little Rock, Arkansas is the best recent example. As usual, the NTSB blamed the pilot, this time for landing in a level 6 thunderstorm and failing to arm or deploy the spoilers (devices on the wing that pop up after landing to spoil the lift to assist in stopping) while citing a multitude of crew errors, including failure to recite the approach briefing and pre-landing checklist to name just a few.
As it turns out, the NTSB was wrong about nearly everything. The crew completed every item of the required approach briefing and pre-landing check list, the spoilers were, in fact, armed but did not deploy, and the sole cause of the deaths and injuries were towering steel approach light structures illegally placed by the Little Rock National Airport in what should have been the Runway Safety Area - a supposedly safe place 1000’ long by 500’ wide and reserved for aircraft that leave the runway for any reason.
No less than six times in the preceding six months, and as late as 10 days before the accident, the aircraft’s spoilers were squawked by flight crews as showing warning signs of imminent failure, yet no corrective action was ever taken. Despite these unresolved and uncorrected maintenance deficiencies, the NTSB criticized the flight crew for not arming the spoilers, even though electrical anomalies were found after the crash and the spoiler handle was discovered in the deployed position. At least six times before the crash, crews experienced asymmetric spool up times in the aircraft’s engines, sometimes by as much as 15 seconds, with no correction, and yet the NTSB accused the crew of improperly using asymmetric reverse thrust on the night of the accident. Frequent reports of binding of the reverse thrust actuators were likewise ignored by maintenance crews, yet the NTSB accused the flight crew of exceeding EPR (engine pressure ratio) limits when applying reverse thrust. With several reported instances of unresolved brake anomalies, the flight crew was even faulted for improper application of the brakes.
The crew was further vilified for flying into adverse weather, a level 6 thunderstorm, yet the Flight Data Recorder revealed virtually no turbulence, proving there was no such encounter. The crew was faulted for exceeding crosswind landing limits and ignoring lowering visibility when the good in-flight visibility confirmed that the crew had been given Runway Visual Range information from the wrong runway and the actual crosswinds were light.
Who came out unscathed from the NTSB investigation? The Little Rock National Airport and the FAA.
The FAA originally wanted no part of a non-standard Runway Safety Area and refused Little Rock National Airport’s repeated requests for a Medium Intensity Approach Light System. The FAA’s rationale made perfect sense. First, the lights would not reduce precision landing minimums for the runway and, therefore, provided no operational benefit. Second, siting problems meant that the Runway Safety Area dimensions would have to be dangerously reduced and non-frangible support structures would no doubt be required.
The Airport, with the application of "political pressure," forced the FAA to reverse itself, reduced the Runway Safety Area from 1000’ to a mere 453’, and then, just beyond this non-standard Runway Safety Area, erected a three-story steel catwalk with 16" diameter steel poles that would, and did, shred the MD-82 that was American 1420, killing Captain Richard Buschmann and ten of his passengers.
After the accident, wanting to head for the hills, the airport management backdated transfer documents so it would appear that the FAA owned the approach light system and catwalk at the time of the accident, instead of the Airport.
An Arkansas federal jury made short shrift of excuses by the Little Rock National Airport and found in favor of the Buschmann family in a recent trial, the only liability trial following this crash. Their multi-million dollar verdict found the Airport liable for the death of Captain Buschmann, effectively exonerating him of any responsibility for the accident but, more importantly, exposing the NTSB’s shockingly inept investigation.
The trial team consisted of Arthur Alan Wolk, Alan D. Mattioni, and Cheryl DeLisle of the Wolk Law Firm, and Mitch Llewellyn of Fort Smith, Arkansas.
June 8th, 2005
The investigation by the NTSB after the June 1, 1999 crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 at Little Rock, Arkansas is the best recent example. As usual, the NTSB blamed the pilot, this time for landing in a level 6 thunderstorm and failing to arm or deploy the spoilers (devices on the wing that pop up after landing to spoil the lift to assist in stopping) while citing a multitude of crew errors, including failure to recite the approach briefing and pre-landing checklist to name just a few.
As it turns out, the NTSB was wrong about nearly everything. The crew completed every item of the required approach briefing and pre-landing check list, the spoilers were, in fact, armed but did not deploy, and the sole cause of the deaths and injuries were towering steel approach light structures illegally placed by the Little Rock National Airport in what should have been the Runway Safety Area - a supposedly safe place 1000’ long by 500’ wide and reserved for aircraft that leave the runway for any reason.
No less than six times in the preceding six months, and as late as 10 days before the accident, the aircraft’s spoilers were squawked by flight crews as showing warning signs of imminent failure, yet no corrective action was ever taken. Despite these unresolved and uncorrected maintenance deficiencies, the NTSB criticized the flight crew for not arming the spoilers, even though electrical anomalies were found after the crash and the spoiler handle was discovered in the deployed position. At least six times before the crash, crews experienced asymmetric spool up times in the aircraft’s engines, sometimes by as much as 15 seconds, with no correction, and yet the NTSB accused the crew of improperly using asymmetric reverse thrust on the night of the accident. Frequent reports of binding of the reverse thrust actuators were likewise ignored by maintenance crews, yet the NTSB accused the flight crew of exceeding EPR (engine pressure ratio) limits when applying reverse thrust. With several reported instances of unresolved brake anomalies, the flight crew was even faulted for improper application of the brakes.
The crew was further vilified for flying into adverse weather, a level 6 thunderstorm, yet the Flight Data Recorder revealed virtually no turbulence, proving there was no such encounter. The crew was faulted for exceeding crosswind landing limits and ignoring lowering visibility when the good in-flight visibility confirmed that the crew had been given Runway Visual Range information from the wrong runway and the actual crosswinds were light.
Who came out unscathed from the NTSB investigation? The Little Rock National Airport and the FAA.
The FAA originally wanted no part of a non-standard Runway Safety Area and refused Little Rock National Airport’s repeated requests for a Medium Intensity Approach Light System. The FAA’s rationale made perfect sense. First, the lights would not reduce precision landing minimums for the runway and, therefore, provided no operational benefit. Second, siting problems meant that the Runway Safety Area dimensions would have to be dangerously reduced and non-frangible support structures would no doubt be required.
The Airport, with the application of "political pressure," forced the FAA to reverse itself, reduced the Runway Safety Area from 1000’ to a mere 453’, and then, just beyond this non-standard Runway Safety Area, erected a three-story steel catwalk with 16" diameter steel poles that would, and did, shred the MD-82 that was American 1420, killing Captain Richard Buschmann and ten of his passengers.
After the accident, wanting to head for the hills, the airport management backdated transfer documents so it would appear that the FAA owned the approach light system and catwalk at the time of the accident, instead of the Airport.
An Arkansas federal jury made short shrift of excuses by the Little Rock National Airport and found in favor of the Buschmann family in a recent trial, the only liability trial following this crash. Their multi-million dollar verdict found the Airport liable for the death of Captain Buschmann, effectively exonerating him of any responsibility for the accident but, more importantly, exposing the NTSB’s shockingly inept investigation.
The trial team consisted of Arthur Alan Wolk, Alan D. Mattioni, and Cheryl DeLisle of the Wolk Law Firm, and Mitch Llewellyn of Fort Smith, Arkansas.
June 8th, 2005
Tuesday, May 23, 2000
EXECUTIVE AIRLINES' JETSTREAM 31 - What The Public Needs to Know
EXECUTIVE AIRLINES' JETSTREAM 31 What The Public Needs to Know
The NTSB is investigating Sunday’s (May 21, 2000) crash of Executive Airlines’ Jetstream 31 at the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport.
Apparently, the flight crew reported that they were losing both engines shortly before the ill-fated craft crashed into hilly terrain near the airport.
The Jetstream 31, with nineteen people aboard, can only carry fuel for 450 nautical miles, or a little over 500 statute miles. That’s less than two hours’ flight time for this airplane. It has been reported that after the flight from Long Island to Atlantic City, the crew did not refuel. Total flight time for these two legs would make the airplane about out of fuel when it reached Wilkes-Barre, which would explain the double engine flameout and inability to restart. Since the Jetstream 31 has an auto-relight feature, if flameout occurs, only the lack of fuel common to both engines would seem to explain this accident. The unusable fuel in the Jetstream 31 is ten gallons, more than enough to create the fireball seen by witnesses and set fire to the cabin of the aircraft.
In 1985, another Jetstream 31 suffered a dual flameout while in a holding pattern in icing conditions. The crew had turned on the engine inlet anti-ice, but not the continuous engine ignition. A slug of ice or water ingested into the engines and shut them down, but they were quickly restarted, averting a disaster. While temperatures on the ground at Wilkes-Barre were well above freezing, at an altitude of as little as six thousand feet above the ground, the temperature in the clouds was near freezing or below, resulting in mixed icing likely encountered on the trip from Atlantic City. If the continuous ignition were not selected, another incident of dual engine failure could have occurred with insufficient altitude remaining for a restart before crashing.
The manufacturer of this aircraft recommends not using the continuous ignition for more than one hour. So, if the crew turned it off before its descent, it would not have been available when needed as temperatures near the ground warmed the aircraft and dislodged the ice.
While the NTSB must examine the engines, the chance of dual engine failure for mechanical reasons is virtually out of the question. Sending them back to their manufacturer for this purpose is of questionable judgment, especially when the recently completed Rand Report on NTSB investigative practices criticized this procedure as fraught with conflicts of interest.
All aspects of this crash must be investigated -- the maintenance of the aircraft, the training and experience of the pilots, the fueling of the aircraft, and the procedures used for ensuring that adequate fuel reserves were aboard for all flights, especially in bad weather. Complicating this process are the notoriously unreliable fuel gauges in aircraft. That is the reason aircraft operators and their flight crews must rely not on the gauges, but rather on the time in the air to manage their fuel. The weather conditions at Wilkes-Barre/Scranton on Sunday were such that any flight crew, properly trained and experienced, should have been able to execute a safe landing, unless the fuel reserves were inadequate or the procedures for descent in icing conditions were not followed. Either of these possibilities is high on the list of likely causes of this preventable accident.
For further comment contact, contact Arthur Alan Wolk, aviation attorney and pilot at 215-545-4220.
The NTSB is investigating Sunday’s (May 21, 2000) crash of Executive Airlines’ Jetstream 31 at the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport.
Apparently, the flight crew reported that they were losing both engines shortly before the ill-fated craft crashed into hilly terrain near the airport.
The Jetstream 31, with nineteen people aboard, can only carry fuel for 450 nautical miles, or a little over 500 statute miles. That’s less than two hours’ flight time for this airplane. It has been reported that after the flight from Long Island to Atlantic City, the crew did not refuel. Total flight time for these two legs would make the airplane about out of fuel when it reached Wilkes-Barre, which would explain the double engine flameout and inability to restart. Since the Jetstream 31 has an auto-relight feature, if flameout occurs, only the lack of fuel common to both engines would seem to explain this accident. The unusable fuel in the Jetstream 31 is ten gallons, more than enough to create the fireball seen by witnesses and set fire to the cabin of the aircraft.
In 1985, another Jetstream 31 suffered a dual flameout while in a holding pattern in icing conditions. The crew had turned on the engine inlet anti-ice, but not the continuous engine ignition. A slug of ice or water ingested into the engines and shut them down, but they were quickly restarted, averting a disaster. While temperatures on the ground at Wilkes-Barre were well above freezing, at an altitude of as little as six thousand feet above the ground, the temperature in the clouds was near freezing or below, resulting in mixed icing likely encountered on the trip from Atlantic City. If the continuous ignition were not selected, another incident of dual engine failure could have occurred with insufficient altitude remaining for a restart before crashing.
The manufacturer of this aircraft recommends not using the continuous ignition for more than one hour. So, if the crew turned it off before its descent, it would not have been available when needed as temperatures near the ground warmed the aircraft and dislodged the ice.
While the NTSB must examine the engines, the chance of dual engine failure for mechanical reasons is virtually out of the question. Sending them back to their manufacturer for this purpose is of questionable judgment, especially when the recently completed Rand Report on NTSB investigative practices criticized this procedure as fraught with conflicts of interest.
All aspects of this crash must be investigated -- the maintenance of the aircraft, the training and experience of the pilots, the fueling of the aircraft, and the procedures used for ensuring that adequate fuel reserves were aboard for all flights, especially in bad weather. Complicating this process are the notoriously unreliable fuel gauges in aircraft. That is the reason aircraft operators and their flight crews must rely not on the gauges, but rather on the time in the air to manage their fuel. The weather conditions at Wilkes-Barre/Scranton on Sunday were such that any flight crew, properly trained and experienced, should have been able to execute a safe landing, unless the fuel reserves were inadequate or the procedures for descent in icing conditions were not followed. Either of these possibilities is high on the list of likely causes of this preventable accident.
For further comment contact, contact Arthur Alan Wolk, aviation attorney and pilot at 215-545-4220.
Tuesday, January 23, 1996
ISN'T THE NTSB IGNORING THE OBVIOUS IN THE USAIR 427 CRASH?
An Editorial Point of View
Why hasn't the NTSB yet reported its findings on the tail of USAir 427? It was one of the largest single components of the airplane that was found and examined, but NTSB spokesperson Carl Vogt has yet to make it a subject of any news conference.
Could it be that the FAA and NTSB would be embarrassed by their previous knowledge of rudder control problems of Boeing 737s?
After a 1991 United 585 crash in Colorado Springs, under strikingly similar circumstances as the USAir 427, the NTSB recommended to the FAA that Boeing 737s be regularly inspected for the possibility of a rudder reversal problem resulting from defects in the power control unit design. The FAA established such a program requiring an inspection every 750 flight hours until the rudder power control unit is redesigned. The USAir Flight 427 aircraft had been examined four times under this inspection program.
Isn't it curious that the NTSB hasn't made this previous rudder control concern now public? Why isn't it focusing more attention on the component that might have caused a previous and similar crash rather than focusing on irrelevant items such as the thrust reverser on the engine?
Obviously, both the NTSB and the FAA would be called to task if it turned out that their recommended and approved rudder power control unit inspection program wasn't sufficient to protect the lives of 132 additional victims.
While it is still too early to draw ironclad conclusions about the cause of the USAir crash, given the obvious similarities to the Colorado Springs crash and the history of the Boeing 737 rudder control, I suggest that some immediate steps be taken to limit the rudder authority on Boeing 737s until a new rudder control can be installed. It would be better to take such a precaution in an attempt to prevent a possible rudder hard-over in light of the fact that it could have been a contributing factor to the USAir 427 crash. Isn't it time that our governmental authorities worry more about insuring public safety than they do about minimizing the economic impact of their actions on the airline industry and those who manufacture aircraft?
Why hasn't the NTSB yet reported its findings on the tail of USAir 427? It was one of the largest single components of the airplane that was found and examined, but NTSB spokesperson Carl Vogt has yet to make it a subject of any news conference.
Could it be that the FAA and NTSB would be embarrassed by their previous knowledge of rudder control problems of Boeing 737s?
After a 1991 United 585 crash in Colorado Springs, under strikingly similar circumstances as the USAir 427, the NTSB recommended to the FAA that Boeing 737s be regularly inspected for the possibility of a rudder reversal problem resulting from defects in the power control unit design. The FAA established such a program requiring an inspection every 750 flight hours until the rudder power control unit is redesigned. The USAir Flight 427 aircraft had been examined four times under this inspection program.
Isn't it curious that the NTSB hasn't made this previous rudder control concern now public? Why isn't it focusing more attention on the component that might have caused a previous and similar crash rather than focusing on irrelevant items such as the thrust reverser on the engine?
Obviously, both the NTSB and the FAA would be called to task if it turned out that their recommended and approved rudder power control unit inspection program wasn't sufficient to protect the lives of 132 additional victims.
While it is still too early to draw ironclad conclusions about the cause of the USAir crash, given the obvious similarities to the Colorado Springs crash and the history of the Boeing 737 rudder control, I suggest that some immediate steps be taken to limit the rudder authority on Boeing 737s until a new rudder control can be installed. It would be better to take such a precaution in an attempt to prevent a possible rudder hard-over in light of the fact that it could have been a contributing factor to the USAir 427 crash. Isn't it time that our governmental authorities worry more about insuring public safety than they do about minimizing the economic impact of their actions on the airline industry and those who manufacture aircraft?
Friday, November 17, 1995
NTSB CONCLUDES HEARINGS ON USAir FLIGHT 427 WITHOUT CONCLUDING THE OBVIOUS-- BLIND TO JAMMING SERVO VALVE
NTSB & FAA Fail To Protect Future Passengers
PHILADELPHIA -- November 17, 1995 -- Today, the NTSB wraps up three days of investigative hearings regarding the cause of the Pittsburgh crash of USAir Flight 427 on September 8, 1994, which resulted in 132 fatalities. Yet, the NTSB and the FAA still refuse to look at the obvious cause of this crash (also the most likely cause of the 1991 United Flight 585 crash in Colorado Springs): the faulty design of the servo valve -- a key component of the Boeing 737s rudder control power unit.
According to internationally-known aviation attorney Arthur A. Wolk, "The NTSB is a `broken part' organization. If a part isn't broken, then it couldn't have caused the crash. However, a malfunctioning part can be just as fatal. The servo valve is known to jam -- for reasons that become `invisible' after the crash.
"What the NTSB fails to do," Wolk continues, "is combine the available evidence with known design limitations and come to reasonable conclusions about the cause. The NTSB and FAA know the servo valve is defectively designed, so it can cause rudder reversals and spontaneous (uncommanded) rudder movements. Hundreds of pilots have reported uncommanded rudder movements in Boeing 737s since the aircraft's original certification, but these complaints fall on deaf ears."
"The NTSB and FAA should demand modifications of the Boeing 737's servo valve simply to comply with the Federal Aviation Regulations, but -- more importantly -- they should demand modifications to save the lives of future passengers."
PHILADELPHIA -- November 17, 1995 -- Today, the NTSB wraps up three days of investigative hearings regarding the cause of the Pittsburgh crash of USAir Flight 427 on September 8, 1994, which resulted in 132 fatalities. Yet, the NTSB and the FAA still refuse to look at the obvious cause of this crash (also the most likely cause of the 1991 United Flight 585 crash in Colorado Springs): the faulty design of the servo valve -- a key component of the Boeing 737s rudder control power unit.
According to internationally-known aviation attorney Arthur A. Wolk, "The NTSB is a `broken part' organization. If a part isn't broken, then it couldn't have caused the crash. However, a malfunctioning part can be just as fatal. The servo valve is known to jam -- for reasons that become `invisible' after the crash.
"What the NTSB fails to do," Wolk continues, "is combine the available evidence with known design limitations and come to reasonable conclusions about the cause. The NTSB and FAA know the servo valve is defectively designed, so it can cause rudder reversals and spontaneous (uncommanded) rudder movements. Hundreds of pilots have reported uncommanded rudder movements in Boeing 737s since the aircraft's original certification, but these complaints fall on deaf ears."
"The NTSB and FAA should demand modifications of the Boeing 737's servo valve simply to comply with the Federal Aviation Regulations, but -- more importantly -- they should demand modifications to save the lives of future passengers."
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